"The prominence of Afyonkarahisar had the means of death" | Belisarius yehl
"The Greek soldiers epolemisen. The impeachment amen accuse Some remarks that dismiss his armor, on the entry of Turkish assault in etrapi fygin is not true. .... With the amount of moral amen enekleien the further the soul bravely imynthi of the fortified positions. If pre-bent enemy five times in the defenses of a faulty line if in the fall of epanikovlithi, drive as drive, cutting off the transport, circled several times, fighting on the day for all points in a futile attempt inelegance and without ammunition and non- food, this is neither surprising, nor is unprecedented. Happened to ... armies Kallion structure the Greek and the best result CONSIDERED. The strategic errors committed ATIN, evarynon startlingly on the scales. The reduced morale syneteinen but not ekrinen ... Main causes of all were unsuccessful:
1. Incorrect choice of defensive location in the range of Afyon. Two. The lack of serious strategic reserve in the exechousan of Afyon. Three. Incorrect direction of resilient struggle from Afyon to Toumlou Bunar, the interesting and important. "
General On August 13, 1922 (p.im.) and after many months of preparation, began the great Turkish attack against the forces of the Army of Asia Minor who were established yehl in defensive locations yehl covering the city of Afyonkarahisar and which was known (and thus went down in history) called "prominent of Afyon." The strategic aim of the Turkish administration was conducting a battle to crush the Greek Army, which would be achieved yehl by centralized attack the main Turkish forces against the weakest point of the Greek defense device to achieve in a short time rupture the Greek defense location then the separation of the Greek forces to reject part or all of the north and out of the bus routes and eventually destroy them. The attack, it was held against the right wing of the prominent Afyon, ie the area contained between the River Tea (mites) in the southeast of Afyonkarahisar and Toumlou yehl Bunar the west.
Of particular interest is the Concept of Higher Turkish administration for WHO, HOW and WHAT FORCES would occur in the major offensive and WHY chosen the right wing of paramount yehl launching the attack:
"Our idea was to give a battle crash, bringing the main forces on a wing, if it were possible, against the external wing of the enemy. We found a good solution to concentrate the main forces south of the right wing of the enemy, which was in the area of Afyonkarahisar and between the River Tea and Toumlou Bunar. There was the greatest and most Vulnerable location of the enemy. There was the perception yehl that the result would be rapid and decisive if attacking from this side "
But in the business directive adopted on 25 July 1922 the commander of the Western Front Ismet Pasha to the Governors of the 1 st and 2 nd Turkish Army, states the following:
What was, however, those features of the right wing of the prominent Afyon which render the one hand the most important of the entire defensive front army Asia Minor and on the other particularly vulnerable to a strong and orderly batter so the Turkish leadership to launch against great attack from time studying and preparing? yehl But why did Mr. Kanellopoulos considers that the incorrect yehl choice of defensive location in the vicinity yehl of Afyon, was one of the three main reasons for the defeat of the Greek Army in the great battle of the curbs of Afyonkarahisar on 13 and 14 August 1922?
This text, the current black and forgotten anniversary of 13 August 1922, comes this purpose yehl to fulfill. To bring to the attention of every Greek who cares about the tragic events of that period, the flaws and weaknesses of the defense of its prominent location yehl Afyon, and how and why it was chosen by the leadership of the Army of Asia Minor and on-site commanders of large units, that highly problematic yehl and vulnerable location hiding death inside her and that under the ruins of the ramparts remain unburied and priceless bones of hundreds of Greek fighters gave everything for the race "per Keynes rimasi peithomenoi." There will also mention some - few - information on the Greek defense was outstanding in the Afyon, and the absence of a strong reserve in the area attempted burglary site. Absence played yehl a decisive role in the final outcome of the battle against Greek arms.
M
"The Greek soldiers epolemisen. The impeachment amen accuse Some remarks that dismiss his armor, on the entry of Turkish assault in etrapi fygin is not true. .... With the amount of moral amen enekleien the further the soul bravely imynthi of the fortified positions. If pre-bent enemy five times in the defenses of a faulty line if in the fall of epanikovlithi, drive as drive, cutting off the transport, circled several times, fighting on the day for all points in a futile attempt inelegance and without ammunition and non- food, this is neither surprising, nor is unprecedented. Happened to ... armies Kallion structure the Greek and the best result CONSIDERED. The strategic errors committed ATIN, evarynon startlingly on the scales. The reduced morale syneteinen but not ekrinen ... Main causes of all were unsuccessful:
1. Incorrect choice of defensive location in the range of Afyon. Two. The lack of serious strategic reserve in the exechousan of Afyon. Three. Incorrect direction of resilient struggle from Afyon to Toumlou Bunar, the interesting and important. "
General On August 13, 1922 (p.im.) and after many months of preparation, began the great Turkish attack against the forces of the Army of Asia Minor who were established yehl in defensive locations yehl covering the city of Afyonkarahisar and which was known (and thus went down in history) called "prominent of Afyon." The strategic aim of the Turkish administration was conducting a battle to crush the Greek Army, which would be achieved yehl by centralized attack the main Turkish forces against the weakest point of the Greek defense device to achieve in a short time rupture the Greek defense location then the separation of the Greek forces to reject part or all of the north and out of the bus routes and eventually destroy them. The attack, it was held against the right wing of the prominent Afyon, ie the area contained between the River Tea (mites) in the southeast of Afyonkarahisar and Toumlou yehl Bunar the west.
Of particular interest is the Concept of Higher Turkish administration for WHO, HOW and WHAT FORCES would occur in the major offensive and WHY chosen the right wing of paramount yehl launching the attack:
"Our idea was to give a battle crash, bringing the main forces on a wing, if it were possible, against the external wing of the enemy. We found a good solution to concentrate the main forces south of the right wing of the enemy, which was in the area of Afyonkarahisar and between the River Tea and Toumlou Bunar. There was the greatest and most Vulnerable location of the enemy. There was the perception yehl that the result would be rapid and decisive if attacking from this side "
But in the business directive adopted on 25 July 1922 the commander of the Western Front Ismet Pasha to the Governors of the 1 st and 2 nd Turkish Army, states the following:
What was, however, those features of the right wing of the prominent Afyon which render the one hand the most important of the entire defensive front army Asia Minor and on the other particularly vulnerable to a strong and orderly batter so the Turkish leadership to launch against great attack from time studying and preparing? yehl But why did Mr. Kanellopoulos considers that the incorrect yehl choice of defensive location in the vicinity yehl of Afyon, was one of the three main reasons for the defeat of the Greek Army in the great battle of the curbs of Afyonkarahisar on 13 and 14 August 1922?
This text, the current black and forgotten anniversary of 13 August 1922, comes this purpose yehl to fulfill. To bring to the attention of every Greek who cares about the tragic events of that period, the flaws and weaknesses of the defense of its prominent location yehl Afyon, and how and why it was chosen by the leadership of the Army of Asia Minor and on-site commanders of large units, that highly problematic yehl and vulnerable location hiding death inside her and that under the ruins of the ramparts remain unburied and priceless bones of hundreds of Greek fighters gave everything for the race "per Keynes rimasi peithomenoi." There will also mention some - few - information on the Greek defense was outstanding in the Afyon, and the absence of a strong reserve in the area attempted burglary site. Absence played yehl a decisive role in the final outcome of the battle against Greek arms.
M
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